
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ERP - PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY

1976 - 1977 MATERIAL



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FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

THE ERP/PRT HAS RECENTLY ACQUIRED	
A FAIRLY LARGE SUM OF MONEY FROM AN UNKNOWN SOURCE. THE MONEY IS	
BEING USED PRIMARILY TO BUILD UP THE ORGANIZATION'S LOGISTICAL	
APPARATUS. THE ERP/PRT LEADERS RESIDING OUTSIDE OF ARGENTINA ARE	
CONTINUING TO DIRECT ERP/PRT ACTIVITIES VIA A NEW POLITICAL SECRETARIAT	
WHICH HAS BEEN SPECIALLY FORMED TO MANAGE THE ORGANIZATION IN ARGENTINA	
DURING THIS PERIOD WHILE THE TOP LEADERS ARE ABROAD.	
2. COMMENT:	
	ar a
	,
RP LEADERSHIP IS URGING ERP/PRT MEMBERS IN THE INTERIOR TO MOVE TO	TT C
FEDERAL CAPITAL OR GREATER BUENOS AIRES. AS A RESULT	
THERE ARE ABOUT 100 ERP/PRT MEMBERS IN	
THE FEDERAL CAPITAL/GREATER BUENOS AIRES REGION.	
THE ERP/PRT LEADERSHIP IS URGING ITS PEOPLE TO MOVE FOR SECURITY	
AND NOT OPERATIONAL REASONS. THE DENSE POPULATION OF THE FEDERAL CAPITA	
REATER BUENOS AIRES AFFORDS BETTER PROTECTION THAN DOES THE LESS	,
POPULATED INTERIOR.)	5

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FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

3. SPECIFIC ERP/PRT LEADERS WHO LEFT ARGENTINA ARE ENRIQUE HAROLDO G O R R I A R A N MERLO, JUAN ARNOLD K R E M E R , CARLOS EMILIO A L L , RAUL C O N C E T T I , CARLOS O R Z O C O A AND JULIO ALFREDO O R O P E L .

25x1 ,	4.	THE FOLL	OWING E	RP/PRT	LEADERS	ARE S	TILL
	IN ARGENTINA AND COMPRISE THE	NEW POLIT	'ICAL SE	CRETARI	AT: HUG	O ALF	REDO
<u> </u>	I R U R Z U N , ALIAS "SANTIAGO	O"; JUAN	CARLOS	L E D	E S M A	, ALI	AS ·
	"EL VISCACHON"; "CAGO"; "LEANDO	OR"; EDUA	RDO MAR	TĮN S	T R E G	G E R	. ,
	ALIASES "MARTIN" AND "LA TIA";	"OSVALDO	о"; нест	OR L C	P E Z;	"CECI	LIA''
	JAVIER RAMON C O C O Z ; LUIS	MARIA A	GUI	RRE,	ALIASES	''TAT	'O''
Ì	AND "EL NEGRO"; SONIA ALICIA	B L E S S	S A , AL	IAS "AN	iGELA"; E	ELENA	
	C O D A N , ALIAS "PAULA"; AND	MARIA NO	ORA M U	NIT	I S. DE		•
\	M E R B I L H A , ALIAS "ALICI	A."					
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SUMMARY: REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP) AND THE ECUADOREAN REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALIST PARTY (PSRE) MET IN QUITO IN OCTOBER 1975 AND REACHED A TENTATIVE AGREEMENT THAT THE ERP WOULD PROVIDE SUPPORT TO THE PSRE, IN RETURN FOR WHICH THE PSRE WOULD SEND PSRE MEMBERS TO ARGENTINA TO JOIN THE ERP AND WOULD SUPPORT THE ERP IN ECUADOR. THE ERP REPRESENTATIVE REPORTED ON THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE ERP. END SUMMARY.

1. IN EARLY OCTOBER 1975 AN UNIDENTIFIED LEADER OF THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP) MET IN QUITO, ECUADOR, POPPER REPORTED FERMANDO M A L D O N A D O DONOSO, SECRETARY

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GENERAL OF THE REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALIST PARTY OF ECUADOR (PSRE). TO DIS-CUSS MUTUAL SUPPORT. AT THAT TIME A TENTATIVE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED BY WHICH THE ERP WOULD PROVIDE THE NASCENT PSRE MILITARY APPARATUS WITH ARMS, FUNDS AND TRAINING. IN RETURN, MALDONADO AGREED THAT THE PSRE WOULD SEND GUERRILLAS TO ARGENTINA TO JOIN THE ERP AND WOULD PROVIDE PROPAGANDA AND OTHER SUPPORT TO THE ERP IN ECUADOR. MALDONADO HAS CHOSEN FERNANDO V I T E R Y. WHO WAS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN ECUADOR IN THE SUMMER OF 1975, AND VICTOR R I V A D E N E I R A CURRENTLY CA MEDICAL STUDENT AT THE CENTRAL UNIVERSITY OF ECUADOR IN QUITO, CTO, BENEVILLE IN THE FIRST CONTINGENT OF PSRE PEOPLE TO JOIN THE ERP. AND RIVADENEIRA RECEIVED GUERRILLA TRAINING IN CHILE DURING THE REGIME VITERY IS PROBABLY COMMENT: OF PRESIDENT SALVADOR A L L E N D E. FERNANDO VITERI ZUNIAGA, A STUDENT AT CENTRAL UNIVERSITY.

VITERI WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR A BOMB INCIDENT DURING THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) CONFERENCE IN QUITO IN NOVEMBER 1974. ARRESTED BY PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES OF THE NATIONAL POLICE AND CONFESSED TO TRAINING PSRE RADICALS IN PREPARING BOMBS AND TO HAVING PARTICIPATED IN SEVERAL BOMBING INCIDENTS. RIVADENEIRA MAY BE IDENTICAL TO VICTOR

HUGO RIVADENEIRA, WHO

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WAS A RADICAL COMMUNIST STUDENT IN THE LATE 1960'S AND INVOLVED
WITH A LEFTIST GROUP DISCUSSING KIDNAPPING OF U.S. CITIZENS, AS WELL
AS WITH GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING OF OTHER LEFTIST STUDENTS.)
2. MALDONADO WAS ACCOMPANIED TO THE MEETING WITH THE ERP BY
TELMO H I D A L G O, A PSRE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBER, AND BY PSRE YOUTH LEADERS WHO SHARE MALDONADO'S COMMITMENT TO GUERRILLA ACTIVITY.
COMMENT: HIDALGO IS DR. TELMO H I D A L G O DIAZ, PROFESSOR
AT CENTRAL UNIVERSITY AND MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF
THE PSRE.
HIDALGO IS THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE PSRE POLITICAL COMMISSION  AND AN ADVISOR TO THE FINANCIAL AND LABOR SECTIONS OF THE PSRE. ALONG WITH DR. MANUEL AGUSTIN A G U I R R E, FORMER PSRE SECRETARY GENERAL  AND CURRENT IDEOLOGICAL LEADER OF THE PSRE, HIDALGO SUPPORTS THE THESIS OF POLITICAL PRECAUTION BUT COMPLETE OPPOSITION TO OTHER LEFTIST PARTIES AND THE GOVERNMENT.) MALDONADO PLANS TO WITHHOLD KNOWLEDGE OF HIS AGREEMENT WITH THE ERP FROM OTHER PSRE MEMBERS UNTIL HE AND HIS FOLLOWERS GAIN FULL CONTROL OF THE PSRE. MALDONADO BELIEVES HE CAN ACCOMPLISH DURING THE PSRE CONGRESS SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY 1976.
PSRE LOSS OF INFLUENCE AMONG STUDENT AND LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

TO THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ECUADOR MARXIST-LENINIST (PCE/ML) IN THE

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SPRING OF 1975 CAUSED CONSIDERABLE DISSENSION WITHIN PSRE RANKS, AND THE PSRE IS SPLIT INTO THREE CAMPS. IN ESSENCE, THE CONSERVATIVE GROUP WANTS TO CONTINUE COOPERATING WITH OTHER LEFTIST PARTIES IN ECUADOR, WHILE THE MORE RADICAL WING WANTS TO BREAK ALL COOPERATION WITH LEFTIST PARTIES AND GO INTO OPPOSITION, INCLUDING ARMED STRUGGLE, TO THE GOVERNMENT. THE THIRD GROUP WANTS TO OPPOSE THE GOVERNMENT, BUT NOT OPENLY, AND TO DEVOTE ITS EFFORTS TO BENEFIT THE WORKERS.)

- 3. IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH MALDONADO, THE ERP LEADER SAID THAT THE ERP'S MORALE IS GOOD; IT HAS ADEQUATE FUNDS, AND ENJOYS GROWING SUPPORT AMONG ARGENTINE WORKERS. IN ADDITION, THE ERP IS FUNDING THE REVOLUTIONARY COORDINATING COUNCIL (JCR), A BUENOS AIRES-BASED GROUP COMPOSED OF LEADERS FROM THE URUGUAYAN TUPAMAROS, THE BOLIVIAN NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (ELN), AND THE CHILEAN MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MIR). THE JCR, HE SAID, IS EFFECTIVELY SUPPORTING THE ERP'S ACTIVITIES.
- 4. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONING FROM MALDONADO, THE ERP LEADER INSISTED THAT HIS GROUP IS NOT SEEKING A SIMILAR ACCORD WITH OTHER EXTREMIST GROUPS IN ECUADOR. THE ERP LEADER IMPLIED, HOWEVER, THAT HE PLANNED TO TRAVEL TO COLOMBIA AND POSSIBLY VENEZUELA TO MAKE SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS WITH EXTREMIST GROUPS IN THOSE COUNTRIES.

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ERP - PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY

1974 - 1975 MATERIAL

SEP 1 8 1975
Coordinator
Deputy Coordinator
Staff Assistent
Intern

ERF

#### Argentine Intelligence man Slain

BUENOS AIRES — A gunman screaming "We've come to liquidate you" shot and killed the Defense Ministry intelligence chief yesterday as he shopped in a suburban grocery store, police said.

They said the gunman fired several shots point blank at Rolando Silioni, ran out of the store and escaped in a car carrying three other persons

caped in a car carrying three other persons.

Newspapers said they received communiques from the so-called Aug. 22 Commando, apparently a splinter group of the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP.), claiming responsibility for the assassination. (The date Aug. 22 marks the killings of 16 left-wing guerrillas at a navy base in 1972.)

# guerrillas boast of rural offensive

**By Reuter** 

**Buenos Aires** 

Argentina's People's Revolutionary Army plans to step up its guerrilla warfare to fan the flames of armed socialist revolution across South America.

The army has founded its first rura brigade, after four years of offensive action in Argentine cities, and it has pledged to subsidize guerrilla organi zations of fellow-Marxists in neigh

boring countries.

Thus the guerrillas, usually known by the Spanish initials ERP ( Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo), hopes to do what Ernest O. "Che" Guevara failed to do — light the fuse of a revolt which would spread throughout the continent.

Guevara, the Argentine-born Cuban revolutionary, was killed by troops in 1967 while trying to establish a center for continent-wide guerrilla activity in the jungles of eastern Bolivia.

Four months ago the ERP announced that it had joined three other leftwing guerrilla organizations, from neighboring countries, in a Latin American revolutionary junta.

One is the rump of Guevara's Bolivian enterprise, the National Lib-

eration Army (ELN).
The second is the revolutionary Movement of the Left (MIR), which operated legally as a vanguard group under the late socialist-President of Chile, Dr. Salvador Allende, but was driven underground after last September's bloody military coup d'etat.
The third is Uruguay's National Liberation Movement (MLN), or Tupamaros. Thousands of suspected MLN members were jailed after an 'internal war'' by the armed forces in

None of the other three movements have anything like the wealth or power of the ERP. But it has just said it will split \$5 million between them, and this could be enough to breathe in new life

The money will come from a ransom paid by the United States owned ESSO (Exxon) Oil Company for the release of a refinery manager, Victor Samuelson, kidnapped last December and released two months ago.

The ransom, \$14,200,000 was, ac cording to military experts here enough to keep about 1,500 guerrillas armed and active for a year.

When the revolutionary junta was founded, the four guerrilla move ments issued a joint communique saying the struggle for socialism in Latin America would be long.

They called on "the exploited Latin American workers, the poor pea-sants, the poor of the cities, the students and intellectuals, the revolutionary Christians, and all those ele-ments originating in the exploiting classes who are willing to work with the just, people's cause," to join them under the banner and the example of ommander Che Guevara.

The ERP until recently operated only in cities. But police and troops scoured a remote region of northwestern Argentina last month in a vain search for a suspected rural ERP brigade.

The ERP has since confirmed that such a brigade exists. It described the government operation against it as a total failure and said it intended to create more rural fronts.

This is not only a challenge to the Argentine government of President Peron, it is also worrying the right wing regimes in Bolivia and Chile. All the wilder parts of Argentina are near their frontiers.

The ERP, hoping to enroll untapped support in the countryside, claimed that it would soon multiply its firepower and be able to take on the armed forces in open combat.

Argentina's Marxist guerrilla movement is already known to have increased its numbers from among former Peronist guerrillas dis appointed with General Peron's conservativism since last year, when he returned to power.

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COMMISSIONER CARMELO M A Y O R A N O, CHIEF OF FEDERAL POLICE 3. SECURITY, HAS ISSUED ORDERS THAT THE POLICE, EXCEPT IN SPECIFICALLY APPROVED CASES, ARE TO CARRY OUT THEIR FUNCTIONS IN A COMPLETELY LEGAL MANNER AND ARE NOT TO RESORT TO EXTRA-LEGAL TERRORIST TACTICS, AS THEY HAVE ON OCCASION IN THE PAST. THE REASON FOR THIS ORDER IS POLITICAL. MAYORANO AND HIS COHORTS WANT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT ALL RIGHTIST VIOLENCE IN RECENT TIMES HAD BEEN THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ARGENTINE ANTI-COMMUNIST ALLIANCE (AAA) WHICH ALLEGEDLY HAD BEEN UNDER THE CONTROL OF JOSE L O P E Z R E G A, FORMER MINISTER OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT. SHOULD RIGHTIST VIOLENCE SUDDENLY CEASE, IN THE OPINION OF THE POLICE, THE PUBLIC WILL THINK IT IS BECAUSE THE AAA IS INACTIVE BECAUSE OF THE CURTAILMENT OF THE POWER OF LOPEZ REGA. COINCEDENCE OF LOPEZ REGA'S REDUCED AUTHORITY WITH THE REDUCTION OF RIGHTIST TERRORISM WILL LEND EVEN GREATER CREDENCE TO LOPEZ REGA'S PURPORTED PREVIOUS TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THE RESULT, AS FAR AS THE POLICE ARE CONCERNED, WILL BE TWOFOLD: A FURTHER DISCREDITING OF LOPEZ REGA AND AN IMPROVED IMAGE OF THE POLICE.

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FORCES HAVE RECEIVED THE NAMES OF CERTAIN ERP MEMBERS WHO ARE EMPLOYED IN VARIOUS COMPANIES IN ARGENTINA. A COORDINATED OPERATION TO PICK UP AS MANY OF THESE ERP PEOPLE AS POSSIBLE IS TENTATIVELY JULY 22, 23 AND 27 HAVE BEEN MENTIONED AS DATES PLANNED FOR LATE JULY 1975. THE POLICE CONSIDER THIS PROPOSED OPERATION TO BE A FOR THE ACTION. LEGAL ONE.

6. THE ERP HAS BEEN CIRCULATING LEAFLETS IN CORDOBA AND TUCUMAN
DURING EARLY JULY 1975. THE LEAFLETS CONCERN THE ARGENTINE ARMY'S
PAST OFFENSIVES AGAINST THE ERP.
OBJECTIVE OF THE ERP IN DISTRIBUTING THIS PROPAGANDA IS TO TRY TO BOOST
MORALE WITHIN THE ERP'S RANKS.
THERE IS A POWER STRUGGLE WITHIN THE ERP CENTERING AROUND A
DISAGREEMENT OVER THE LEADERSHIP POLICIES OF MARIO S A N T U C H O.

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National Intelligence Bulletin

June 18, 1974

ARGENTINA

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The Marxist People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) recently announced plans to form rural guerrilla\_fronts, following four years of major successes in urban subversion. The terrorist leaders apparently intend to concentrate both on increasing internal activities and strengthening ties with similar groups in neighboring countries.

According to a communique signed by guerrilla leader Roberto Santucho, the move to develop an operating capability in the countryside will enable his organization to maintain closer contact with subversive groups in neighboring countries and "fan the flames of armed socialist revolution across South America." The communique stated that part of the funds obtained in the ransom of Exxon executive Victor Samuelson had been distributed to these groups.

The ERP announced earlier this year that it was establishing a coordinating junta with marxist organizations in Chile, Bolivia, and Uruguay, but there has been little evidence until recently of increased activity.

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The simultaneous development of urban and rural guerrilla fronts may also represent a propaganda effort to point up embarrassing failures of recent security operations. Last month, hundreds of police and soldiers raided a rural guerrilla base in northwest Argentina. The widely publicized operation came to an embarrassing end when the ERP temporarily seized the town from which the security forces had operated.

Despite the new emphasis on rural guerrilla fronts, it is unlikely that the ERP will shift its main focus away from the cities. Rural areas could, however, serve as a temporary haven should the government's counter-terrorist program eventually prove more successful. Rural insurgencies in other Latin countries have generally failed for lack of local support.

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